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Abstract
Within the context of video games the notion of
perfectly rational agents can be undesirable as it
leads to uninteresting situations, where humans
face tough adversarial decision makers. Current
frameworks for stochastic games and reinforce-
ment learning prohibit tuneable strategies as they
seek optimal performance. In this paper, we en-
able such tuneable behaviour by generalising soft
Q-learning to stochastic games, where more than
one agent interact strategically. We contribute
both theoretically and empirically. On the theory
side, we show that games with soft Q-learning ex-
hibit a unique value and generalise team games
and zero-sum games far beyond these two ex-
tremes to cover a continuous spectrum of gaming
behaviour. Experimentally, we show how tuning
agents’ constraints affect performance and demon-
strate, through a neural network architecture, how
to reliably balance games with high-dimensional
representations.
1 Introduction
Stochastic Games (SG) provide a natural extension of re-
inforcement learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998; Mnih et al.,
2015; Busoniu et al., 2010; Peters et al., 2010] to multi-
ple agents, where adapting strategies in presence of humans
or other agents is necessary [Shapley, 1953; Littman, 1994;
Littman, 2001].
Current frameworks for stochastic games assume perfectly
rational agents – an assumption that is violated in a variety of
real-world scenarios, e.g., human-robot interaction [Goodrich
and Schultz, 2007], and pick-up and drop-off domains [Agus-
surja and Lau, 2012]. In the context of computer games, the
main focus of this paper, such a problem of perfect rationality
is even more amplified. Here, in fact, it is not desirable to de-
sign agents that seek optimal behaviour as this leads humans
to become quickly uninterested when playing against adver-
sarial agents that are impossible to defeat [Hunicke, 2005].
Hence, to design games with adaptable and balancing prop-
erties tailored to human-level performance, there is a need
to extend state-of-the-art SG beyond optimality to allow for
tuneable behaviour.
One method to produce tuneable behaviour in reinforce-
ment learning is to introduce an adjustable Kullback-Leibler
(KL) constraint between the agent’s policy and a reference
one. In particular, by increasingly strengthening this con-
straint we can obtain policies increasingly close to the ref-
erence policy, and vice versa. Bounding policy updates in
such a manner has been previously introduced in literature
under different names. Examples include KL control, relative
entropy policy search [Peters et al., 2010], path integral con-
trol [Kappen, 2005; Braun et al., 2011], information-theoretic
bounded rationality [Ortega and Braun, 2013], information-
theory of decisions and actions [Tishby and Polani, 2011;
Rubin et al., 2012], and soft Q-learning [Fox et al., 2016;
Haarnoja et al., 2017]. Targeted problems using these meth-
ods are also wide-spread, e.g., tackling the overestimation
problem in tabular Q-learning [Fox et al., 2016] and in Deep
Q-networks [Leibfried et al., 2017], accounting for model
misspecification [Grau-Moya et al., 2016], introducing safe
policy updates in robot learning [Schulman et al., 2015], and
inducing risk-sensitive control [van den Broek et al., 2010].
Contributions: Though abundant in literature, previous
works only consider single-agent problems and are not read-
ily applicable to stochastic games, which consider more than
one interacting entity. With game balancing as our motiva-
tion, we propose a novel formulation of SG where agents
are subject to KL constraints. In particular, our formulation
introduces two KL constraints, one for each agent, limiting
the space of available policies, which, in turn, enables tune-
able behaviour. We then introduce an online strategy that can
be used for game-play balancing even in high-dimensional
spaces through a neural network architecture.
In short, the contributions of this paper can be summarised
as: (1) proving convergence of the two-player soft Q-learning
to a fixed point through contractions; (2) generalising team
and zero-sum games in a continuous fashion and showing a
unique value; (3) demonstrating convergence to correct be-
haviour by tuning the KL constraints on a simplified grid-
world scenario; (4) extending our method to handle high-
dimensional spaces; and (5) inferring opponent’s Lagrange
multiplier by maximum-likelihood, and demonstrating game-
balancing behaviour on the game of Pong.
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2 Background
2.1 Reinforcement Learning
In reinforcement learning (RL) [Sutton and Barto, 1998]
an agent interacts with an unknown environment to deter-
mine an optimal policy that maximises total expected re-
turn. These problems are formalised as Markov decision
processes (MDPs). Formally, an MDP is defined as the tu-
ple 〈S,A, T ,R, γ〉 where S is the state space, A the ac-
tion space, and T : S × A × S → [0, 1] denotes the state
transition density. Namely, when being in state st ∈ S
and applying an action at ∈ A, the agent transitions to
st+1 ∼ T (st+1|st,at). The reward functionR : S×A → R
quantifies the agent’s performance and γ is the discount fac-
tor that trades off current and future rewards. The goal is
to implement a policy that maximises total discounted re-
wards, i.e., pi?(a|s) = argmaxpi V pi(s), where V pi(s) =
E
[∑∞
t=0 γ
tR(st,at)
]
.
2.2 Single Agent Soft Q-Learning
A way to constrain the behaviour of an agent is to modify
the feasibility set of allowable policies. This can be achieved
by introducing a constraint, such as a KL between two policy
distributions, to the reinforcement learning objective. Such
an approach has been already used within single agent rein-
forcement learning. For example, soft Q-learning has been
used to reduce the overestimation problem of standard Q-
learning [Fox et al., 2016] and for building flexible energy-
based policies in continuous domains [Haarnoja et al., 2017].
Most of these approaches modify the standard objective of
reinforcement learning to
max
pi
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtR(st,at)
]
s.t.
∞∑
t=0
E
[
γtKL (pi(at|st)||ρ(at|st))
] ≤ C, (1)
where C is the amount of bits (or nats if using the natural
logarithm) measured by the KL divergence that the policy pi is
allowed to deviate from a reference policy ρ. The expectation
operation is over state-action trajectories.
To solve the above constrained problem, one typically in-
troduces a Lagrange multiplier, β, and rewrites an equivalent
unconstrained problem
V?(s) = max
pi
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
R(st,at)− 1
β
log
pi(at|st)
ρ(at|st)
)]
.
To derive an algorithm for solving the above, one comes
to recognise that V?(s) also satisfies a recursion similar to
that introduced by the Bellman equations [Puterman, 1994].
Additionally, the optimal policy can be written in closed form
as
pi?(a|s) = ρ(a|s)e
βQ?(s,a)∑
a∈A ρ(a|s)eβQ?(s,a)
,
where Q?(s,a) := R(s,a) +∑s′∈S T (s′|s,a)V?(s′), and
s′ ∈ S. Notice that the above represents a generalisation of
standard RL settings, where β → ∞ corresponds to a per-
fectly rational valuation (V?β→∞(s) = maxpi V pi(s)), while
for β → 0 we recover the valuation under ρ (V?β→0(s) =
V ρ(s)). Clearly, we can generate a continuum of policies
between the reference and the perfectly rational policy that
maximises the expected reward by tuning the choice of β as
detailed in [Leibfried et al., 2017].
2.3 Two-Player Stochastic Games
In two-player stochastic games [Shapley, 1953; Littman,
1994], two agents, that we denote as the player and the oppo-
nent, are interacting in an environment. Each agent executes
a policy that we write as pipl and piop. At some time step t, the
player chooses an action aplt ∼ pipl
(
aplt |st
)
, while the oppo-
nent picks aopt ∼ piop
(
aopt |st
)
. Accordingly, the environment
transitions to a successor state st+1 ∼ TG
(
st+1|st,aplt ,aopt
)
,
where TG denotes the joint transition model for the game. Af-
ter transitioning to a new state, both agents receive a particu-
lar reward depending on the type of game considered. In team
games, both the player and the opponent maximise the same
reward function RG
(
st,a
pl
t ,a
op
t
)
. For zero-sum games, the
player seeks to maximise RG , whereas the opponent seeks
to find a minimum. We write the policy dependent value as
V piplpiop(s) := E
[∑∞
t=0 γ
tRG
(
st,a
pl
t ,a
op
t
)]
where, in con-
trast to the one-player setting, the expectation is over state
and joint-action trajectories.
In stochastic games it is common to assume perfect ra-
tionality for both agents i.e., in the case of a zero-sum
game the player computes the optimal value of state s
as V ?plzs (s) = maxpipl minpiop V
piplpiop(s), while the oppo-
nent as V ?opzs (s) = minpiop maxpipl V
piplpiop(s). Similarly, in
team games the optimal value for the player is V ?pltg (s) =
maxpipl maxpiop V
piplpiop(s) and for the opponent V ?optg (s) =
maxpiopp maxpipl V
piplpiop(s). Although it is straightforward to
show that for team games V ?optg (s) = V
?pl
tg (s), an important
classic result in game theory – the minimax theorem [Os-
borne and Rubinstein, 1994] – states that for zero-sum games
V ?opzs (s) = V
?pl
zs (s), i.e both team and zero sum games have
a unique value.
Importantly, in complex games with large state-spaces the
max and the min operations over all available policies are
extremely difficult to compute. Humans and suboptimal
agents seek to approximate these operations as best they can
but never fully do so due to the lack of computational re-
sources [Ortega and Stocker, 2016], approximations and in-
troduced biases [Lieder et al., 2012]. This limits the applica-
bility of SG when interacting with suboptimal entities, e.g., in
computer games when competing against human players. We
next provide the first extension, to the best of our knowledge,
of soft Q-learning to SGs and show how our framework can
be used within the context of balancing the game’s difficulty.
3 Two-Player Soft Q-Learning
To enable soft Q-learning in two-player games we introduce
two KL constraints that allow us to separately control the per-
formance of both agents. In particular, we incorporate a con-
straint similar to (1) into the objective function for each agent
and apply the method of Lagrange multipliers
Vpiplpiop(s) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
RG
(
st,a
pl
t ,a
op
t
)
(2)
− 1
βpl
log
pipl(a
pl
t |st)
ρpl(a
pl
t |st)
− 1
βop
log
piop(a
op
t |st)
ρop(a
op
t |st)
)]
,
where the expectation is over joint-action trajectories,
1
βpl
log
pipl(a
pl
t |st)
ρpl(a
pl
t |st)
is the information cost for the player (that
turns into a KL divergence with the expectation operator),
and 1βop log
piop(a
op
t |st)
ρop(a
op
t |st) is the information cost for the opponent.
The Lagrange multipliers βpl and βop are tuneable parame-
ters that we can vary at will. The distributions ρpl(a
pl
t |st)
and ρop(a
op
t |st) are the arbitrary reference policies that we
assume to be uniform1. Using the above, the player and the
opponent compute optimal soft-value of a state s using
V?pl(s) = max
pipl
ext
piop
Vpiplpiop(s), V?op(s) = ext
piop
max
pipl
Vpiplpiop(s).
(3)
We define the extremum operator ext to correspond to a max
in the case of positive βop and to a min in the case of negative
βop.
It is clear that this novel formulation of the optimisation
problems in Equations (3) generalise to cover both zero-sum
and team games depending on the choice of βop. By fixing
βpl →∞ and setting βop → −∞ or βop →∞ we recover, re-
spectively, a zero-sum or a team game with perfectly rational
agents. For βop → 0 we derive a game by which the oppo-
nent simply employs policy ρop. For finite values of βop, we
obtain a continuum of opponents with bounded performance
ranging from fully adversarial to fully collaborative including
a random policy. It is important to note, as we will show later,
that the analytical form of the optimal policies that solve (3)
are independent of the extremum operator and only depend
on the parameters βpl and βop.
3.1 Unique Value for Two-Player Soft Q-Learning
In this section we show that the equations in (3) are equiva-
lent, V?pl(s) = V?op(s), for any βpl and βop, that is, our two
player soft Q-learning exhibit a unique value.
We start by defining the free energy operator as
f(pipl, piop, s,V) := Epipl,piop
[
RG(s,apl,aop) + γETG [V(s′)]
− 1
βpl
log
pipl(a
pl|s)
ρpl(apl|s) −
1
βopp
log
piop(a
op|s)
ρop(aop|s)
]
(4)
for an arbitrary free energy vector V . Then the Bellman-
like operators for both the player and the opponent can be
1Please note considering other reference policies is left as an in-
teresting direction for future work.
expressed as:
BplV(s) = max
pipl
ext
piop
f(pipl, piop, s,V) (5)
BopV(s) = ext
piop
max
pipl
f(pipl, piop, s,V).
Proof Sketch: For proving our main results, summarised
in Theorem 2, we commence by showing that the equa-
tions in (3) are equivalent. This is achieved by showing that
the two operators in Equation (5) are in fact equivalent, see
Lemma 1. Proving these operators to be contractions con-
verging to a unique fixed point (see Theorem 1), we conclude
that V?pl(s) = V?op(s) (see Appendix for proof details).
Lemma 1. For any βpl ∈ R and βop ∈ R, and arbitrary free
energy vector V , then BplV(s) = BopV(s).
Due to Lemma 1, we can define the generic operator
BV(s) := BplV(s) = BopV(s). Then, for this generic op-
erator, we can prove the following.
Theorem 1 (Contraction). For βop ∈ R and βpl ∈ R, the
operator B is an L∞-norm contraction map ‖BV −BV¯‖∞ ≤
γ‖V − V¯‖∞, where V and V¯ are two arbitrary free energy
vectors and γ is the discount factor.
Note that our reward is policy dependent (in the infor-
mation cost) and, therefore, Theorem 1 is not a direct con-
sequence of known results [Littman and Szepesva´ri, 1996],
which assume that these rewards are policy independent. Us-
ing the above and the Banach’s fixed point theorem [Puter-
man, 1994], we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Unique fixed point). The contraction mapping
B exhibits a unique fixed-point V? such that BV? = V?.
Due to Lemma 1, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we arrive at
the following.
Corollary 2. Two-player stochastic games with soft Q-
learning have a unique value, i.e. V?pl(s) = V?op(s).
3.2 Bounded-Optimal Policies
Corollary 2 allows us to exploit the fact that there exists one
unique value to generate the policies for both agents. With
this in mind, we next design an algorithm (similar in spirit
to standard Q-Learning) that acquires tuneable policies. We
start by defining a state-action value function, in resemblance
to the Q-function, as
Q?(s,apl,aop) := RG(s,apl,aop) + γETG [V?(s′)] .
For action selection, neither the player nor the opponent can
directly use Q? as it depends on the action of the other
agent, which is unknown a priori. Instead, it can be shown
that agents must first compute the certainty equivalent by
marginalising Q? as
Q?pl(s,apl) :=
1
βop
log
∑
aop
ρop(a
op|s) exp (βopQ?(s,apl,aop))
Q?op(s,aop) :=
1
βpl
log
∑
apl
ρpl(a
pl|s) exp (βplQ?(s,apl,aop)) .
With these definitions and using standard variational calcu-
lus, we obtain optimal policies for both the player and the
opponent as2
pi?pl(a
pl|s) = argmax
pipl
ext
piop
f(pipl, piop, s,V?)
=
1
Zpl(s)
ρpl(a
pl|s) exp (βplQ?pl(s,apl)) (6)
pi?op(a
op|s) = argext
piop
max
pipl
f(pipl, piop, s,V?)
=
1
Zop(s)
ρop(a
op|s) exp
(
βopQ?op(s,aop)
)
,
whereZpl(s) andZop(s) are normalising functions which can
be exactly computed when assuming small discrete action
spaces.
Hence, V?(s) can be expressed in closed form by incorpo-
rating the optimal policies in Equation (3) giving
V?(s) = 1
βpl
log
∑
apl
ρpl(a
pl|s) exp (βplQ?pl(s,apl)) . (7)
As summarised in Algorithm 1, we learn Q?(s,apl,aop)
by applying the following recursion rule:
Qk+1(s,apl,aop) = Qk(s,apl,aop) (8)
+ α
(RG(s,apl,aop) + γVk(s′)−Qk(s,apl,aop)).
Here, α is the learning rate, k the learning step, and Vk(s′) is
computed as in Equation (7) using the current Qk estimate.
Algorithm 1 Two-Player Soft Q-Learning
1: Given ρpl, ρop, βpl, βop, A, S and learning rate α
2: Q(s,apl,aop)← 0
3: while not converged do
4: Collect transition
(
st,a
pl
t ,a
op
t ,Rt, s′t
)
, where apl ∼
pipl, aop ∼ piop andRt is the reward at time t.
5: Update Q according to Equation (8)
6: end while
7: return Q(s,apl,aop)
4 Real-World Considerations
Two restrictions limit the applicability of our algorithm to
real-world scenarios. First, Algorithm 1 implicitly assumes
the knowledge of the opponent’s parameter βop. Obtaining
βop in real-world settings can prove difficult. Second, our
algorithm has been developed for low-dimensional state rep-
resentations. Clearly, this restricts its applicability to high-
dimensional states that are typical to computer games.
To overcome these issues, we next develop an online max-
imum likelihood procedure to infer βop from data gathered
through the interaction with the opponent, and then generalise
Algorithm 1 to high-dimensional representations by propos-
ing a deep learning architecture.
2Note that, if we assume that the action space has low cardinality,
Q?pl(s,apl) andQ?op(s,aop) can be computed exactly.
4.1 Estimating βop & Game-Balancing
Rather than assuming access to the opponents rationality pa-
rameter, we next devise a maximum likelihood estimate that
allows the agent to infer (in an online fashion) about βop and
consequently, about the real policy of the opponent (through
Equation (6)).
Contrary to current SG techniques that attempt to approx-
imate the opponent’s policy directly, our method allows to
reason about the opponent by only approximating a one di-
mensional parameter, i.e., βop in Equation (6)3.
Estimating βop: We frame the problem of estimating βop as
a one of online maximum likelihood estimation. Namely, we
assume that the player interacts in R rounds with the oppo-
nent. At each round, j, the player gathers a dataset of the form
D(j) =
{
s
(j)
i ,a
(j),pl
i ,a
(j),op
i
}m(j)
i=1
withm(j) denoting the to-
tal number of sampled transitions during round j. GivenD(j),
the agent estimates its knowledge of the opponent’s model
i.e., βop by solving the following problem4
max
βop
log Pr
(
D(j)
)
:= max
βop
m(j)∑
i=1
log pi?op
(
a
(j),op
i |s(j)i
)
,
where pi?op
(
a
(j),op
i |s(j)i
)
is defined in Equation (6). As
rounds progress, the agent should learn to improve its esti-
mate of βop. Such an improvement is quantified, in terms of
regret5, in the following theorem for both a fixed and a time-
varying opponent.
Theorem 2. After R rounds, the average static-regret for es-
timating βop vanishes as:
R∑
j=1
Lj(β(j)op )−min
u
[ R∑
j=1
Lj(u)
]
≈ O(
√
R) (9)
For a time-varying opponent, the dynamic regret bound dic-
tates:
R∑
j=1
Lj(β(j)op )−
R∑
j=1
min
uj
Lj(uj) ≈ O
(√
R1 + R−1∑
j=1
||u?j+1 − u?j ||22
),
with Lj(·) denoting the negative of the log-likelihood and
u?j = arg minu Lj(u).
3Please note that similar to the previous section we assume the
opponent’s reference policy ρop to be uniform. This, however, does
not impose a strong restriction since having a uniform reference pol-
icy enables enough flexibility to model various degrees of the oppo-
nent’s performances (see Section 5).
4Please note that this problem can be easily solved using stochas-
tic gradient descent.
5Regret is a standard notion to quantify the performance of an
online learning algorithm. Regret measures the performance of the
agent with respect to an adversary that has access to all information
upfront.
(a) High Rationality (b) Low Rationality (c) Broad Range
Figure 1: Evolution of reward and Bellman error during training for different βpl and βop. We vary βop while fixing βpl = 20 in panels (a),
and βpl = 5.0 in panels (b). The heat map in (c) visualises these rewards for a broader range of parameters. These results confirm that our
approach can modulate performance.
From the above theorem we conclude that against a fixed-
opponent our method guarantees correct approximation of
βop. This is true since the average regret, O(
√
R)/R, van-
ishes as R → ∞. When it comes to a dynamic opponent,
however, it is clear that our bound depends on how the value
of the opponents multiplier parameter (in other words its pol-
icy) vary with in terms of rounds. In case these variations
are bounded in number, we can still guarantee vanishing re-
grets. If not, the regret bound can grow arbitrarily large since∑R−1
j=1 ||u?j+1 − u?j ||22 can introduce a factor R.
Game Balancing: Now that we have a way to learn Q?
and estimate βop simultaneously, we could balance the game
using the estimate of βop to adjust the player’s parameter βpl.
A simple heuristic that proved successful in our experiments
was to simply set βpl = |βop| + ∆, where ∆ denotes an ad-
ditional performance-level the player can achieve. Setting
∆ = 0 would correspond to agents with the same KL con-
straints, whereas setting ∆ > 0 would imply a stronger player
with a softer KL constraint (see Section 5.2).
4.2 Deep Two-Player Soft Q-Learning
When tackling higher dimensional problems, one has to
rely on function approximators to estimate the Q-function,
or in our case, the function Q(s,apl,aop). We borrow
two ideas from deep Q-networks [Mnih et al., 2015] that
allow us to stabilise learning with high-dimensional rep-
resentations for our SG setting. First, we use the no-
tion of a replay memory to store the following transitions
(s,apl,aop, s′,RG(·)) and, second, we use a target network
denoted by Q(s,apl,aop;θ−i ) to handle non-stationarity of
the objective. We learn Q(s,apl,aop;θi), by using a neu-
ral network that receives s as input and outputs a matrix
of Q-values for each combination of the agents’ actions.
The loss function that we seek to minimise is L(θi) =
E
[ (RG(s,apl,aop) + γV(s;θ−i )−Q(s,apl,aop;θi))2 ]
with the expectation taken over the distribution of transi-
tions sampled from the replay memory, and V(s;θ−i ) com-
puted as in Equation (7). Clearly, the above optimisation
problem is similar to standard DQNs with the difference that
error is measured between soft Q-values.
5 Experiments
We consider two cases in our experiments. The first assumes
a low-dimensional setting, while the second targets the high-
dimensional game of Pong. In both cases we consider full
and no control of the opponent. Full control will allow us
to validate our intuitions of tuneable behaviour, while the
second sheds-the-light on the game balancing capabilities of
Section 4.
5.1 Low-dimensional Experiments
The Setup: We validate Algorithm 1 on a 5 × 6 grid-world,
where we consider two agents interacting. Each can choose
an action from A = {left, right, up, down, pick-up}. The first
four actions are primitive movements, while the last corre-
sponds to picking-up an object when possible. The reward of
the first player is set to −0.02 for any movement and to +1
for picking up the object located in cell (2,6).
The setting described in this paper allows for a range of
games that can be continuously varied between cooperative
and defective games depending on the choice of βop – a set-
ting not allowed by any of the current techniques to stochastic
games. In other words, the goal of the opponent, now, de-
pends on the choice of βop. Namely, for positive values of
βop, the opponent is collaborative, whereas for negative βop it
is adversarial. βop values in between correspond to tuneable
performance varying between the above two extremes.
We demonstrate adversarial behaviour by allowing agents
to block each other either when trying to reach the same cell,
or when attempting to transition to a cell previously occupied
by the other agent. In such cases the respective agent remains
in its current position. Given the determinism of the envi-
ronment, a perfectly rational adversarial opponent can always
impede the player to reach the goal. However, due to the KL
constraints the opponent’s policy becomes “less” aggressive,
allowing the player to exploit the opponent’s mistakes and ar-
rive to the goal. For all experiments we used a high learning
rate of α = 0.56.
Tuning the Player’s Performance: To validate tune-
ablity, we assess the performance of the player when
reaching convergence while varying βpl and βop. In the
first set of experiments, we fixed βpl = 20 and varied
βop = {−20,−15,−10,−5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20}. We expect
that the player obtains high reward for collaborative oppo-
nents (βop > 0) or highly sub-optimal adversarial opponents
(βop ≈ 0), and low rewards for strong adversarial opponents
6A deterministic environment transitions allows for a large learn-
ing rate.
(βop  0). Indeed, the results shown in Figure 1(a) confirm
these intuitions.
For a broader spectrum of analysis, we lower βpl from 20
to 5 and re-run the same experiments. Results in Figure 1(b)
reaffirm the previous conclusions. Here, however, the player
attains slightly lower rewards as βpl is decremented. Finally,
in Figure 1(c) we plot the reward attained after convergence
for a broad range of parameter values. We clearly see the
effect of the modulation in both parameters on the resultant
reward. The best reward is achieved when both parameters
have positive high values, and the least reward for the lowest
values.
Estimating βop: The goal of these experiments is to evalu-
ate the correctness of our maximum likelihood estimate (Sec-
tion 4.1) of βop. To conduct these experiments, we fixed
βpl = 10 and generated data with β?op = 5 and β
?
op = −10
that are unknown to the player. At each interaction with the
environment, we updated V(·) according to Algorithm 1 and
βop using a gradient step in the maximum likelihood objec-
tive. Results reported in Figure 2, clearly demonstrate that
our extension to estimate βop is successful7.
5.2 High-dimensional Experiments
We repeat the experiments above but now considering our
deep learning architecture of Section 4.2 on the game of Pong.
The Setup: We use the game Pong from the Roboschool
package8. The state space is 13-dimensional i.e., x-y posi-
tions and x-y- velocities for both agents and the ball, and an
additional dimension for time. We modified the action space
to consist of |A| = 9 actions where the set corresponds to
A = {left, stay, right} × {up, stay, down}. We also mod-
ified the reward function to make it compatible with zero-
sum games in such a way that if the player scores, the re-
wardRG is set to +1, whereas if the opponent scores, to −1.
The networks that represent soft Q-values,Q(s,apl,aop), are
multilayer perceptrons composed of two hidden layers, each
with 100 units, and an a matrix output layer composed of
|A × A| = 81 units (9 × 9 actions). Here, each unit denotes
a particular combination of apl ∈ A and aop ∈ A. After each
hidden layer, we introduce a ReLU non-linearity. We used a
learning rate of 10−4, the ADAM optimizer, a batch size of
32, and updated the target every 30000 training steps.
Tuning the Player’s Performance: In this experiment,
we demonstrate successful tuneable performance. Figure 3
shows that for a highly adversarial opponent (i.e., βop = −50)
the player (βpl = 20) acquired negative rewards, whereas
for a weak opponent or even collaborative, the player ob-
tained high reward. Game-play videos can be found at
https://sites.google.com/site/submission3591/.
Estimating βop and game balancing: Finally, we assess
the performance of the maximum likelihood estimator ap-
plied to game balancing using neural networks. We pre-
trained a policy for the opponent with parameters β?pl = 50.0
and βop = −20.0, thus the player being stronger than the
7In the case where the opponent would have an arbitrary policy
pia then βopwould converge to a value that attempts to make piop,βop
as close as possible to pia.
8https://github.com/openai/roboschool
Figure 2: Reward, Bellman error and βop estimate over episodes.
We see that the maximum likelihood estimator is capable of discov-
ering the correct value for the red (β?op = −10) and blue (β?op = 5)
opponents, from three different initial estimates of βop.
Figure 3: Results on Pong showing player’s (βpl = 20) performance
depending on βop. We see that lower values of βop yield more ag-
gressive opponents, depicting lower reward for the player.
Figure 4: Player’s performance depending on our game balancing
scheme (see Section 4.1). We see that without balancing, the (fixed)
player is much stronger than the opponent, whereas we obtain dif-
ferent performances depending on the balance parameter ∆. On the
right, we show the parameter βpl adapted online through the current
βˆop estimate.
opponent (see blue line in Figure 4). In Figure 4, we demon-
strate game balancing using Section 4.1. In particular, we are
able to vary the player’s performance by adapting (online)
βpl. For instance, if we set βpl close to βop we observe that
the player is as strong as the opponent attaining 0 reward, see
green line.
6 Conclusion
We extended two-player stochastic games to agents with KL
constraints. We evaluated our method theoretically and em-
pirically in both small and high-dimensional state spaces.
The most interesting direction for future work is to scale our
method to a large number of interacting agents by extending
the approach in [Mguni et al., 2018].
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof Lemma 1
Proof. The function f(pipl, piop, s,V) is a concave function
in pipl when fixing piop because the terms Epiplpiop [RG ] and
γEpiplpiopTGV(s′) are linear in pipl, the last term is constant
and the relative entropy term − 1βpl KL(pipl||ρpl) is concave for
βpl > 0. Similarly, f(pipl, piop, s,V) is convex in piop when
fixing pipl because − 1βop KL(piop||ρop) is convex for βop < 0
and all the other term are linear or constant in piop. If
f(pipl, piop, s,F) is a concave-convex function then
max
pipl
min
piop
f(pipl, piop, s,V) = min
piop
max
pipl
f(pipl, piop, s,V).
For the remaining case it is trivial to show that
max
pipl
max
piop
f(pipl, piop, s,V) = max
piop
max
pipl
f(pipl, piop, s,V).
Therefore, BplV(s) = BopV(s).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We start by proving two propositions that we use later in the
proof of Theorem 1.
Proposition 1.
|max
x
f(x)−max
x
g(x)| ≤ max
x
|f(x)− g(x)|
Proof. Given that
|x| = |−x| =⇒
|max
x
f(x)−max
x
g(x)| = |max
x
g(x)−max
x
f(x)|,
we can assume without loss of generality that maxx f(x) ≥
maxx g(x). Let x′ = arg max f(x) then
|max
x
f(x)−max
x
g(x)| ≤ |f(x′)− g(x′)|
≤ max
x
|f(x)− g(x)|
Proposition 2.
|min
x
f(x)−min
x
g(x)| ≤ max
x
|f(x)− g(x)|
Proof. Given that
|x| = |−x| =⇒
|min
x
f(x)−min
x
g(x)| = |min
x
g(x)−min
x
f(x)|,
Therefore, without loss of generality we can assume
minx f(x) ≥ minx g(x). Let x′ = arg min g(x) then
|min
x
f(x)−min
x
g(x)| ≤ |f(x′)− g(x′)|
≤ max
x
|f(x)− g(x)|
Corollary 3. From Proposition 1 and 2 we can conclude that
|extx f(x) − extx g(x)| ≤ maxx|f(x) − g(x)| where both
extremum operators are equal and either max or min.
Proof Theorem 1 Now we continue with the full proof of
Theorem 1.
Proof. To show contraction, we start by explicitly rewriting
the infinity norm as
‖BV − BV¯‖∞ = max
s∈S
∣∣BV(s)− BV¯(s)∣∣
= max
s∈S
∣∣∣max
pipl
ext
piop
f(pipl, piop, s,V)
−max
pipl
ext
piop
f(pipl, piop, s, V¯)
∣∣∣
= max
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣maxpipl Epipl [Qpl(s,apl)]− 1βpl KL(pipl||ρpl)
−max
pipl
Epipl
[Q¯pl(s,apl)]− 1
βpl
KL(pipl||ρpl)
∣∣∣∣∣,
where from the second equality to the third we solved
extpiop f(pipl, piop, s,F) and, Qpl(s,apl) and Q¯pl(s,apl) are
computed as in the equations from the main text (that de-
pend on Q(s, apl, apl) and V(s) recursively). By using the
extremum operator (that can be either max or min) we cover
the cases where βop is either positive or negative. We continue
with the proof by applying Corollary 3 to the last equality,
which gives
‖BV − BV¯‖∞ ≤ max
s∈S
max
apl∈A
∣∣Qpl(s,apl)− Q¯pl(s,apl)∣∣ .
Note that this is valid for both cases when having negative βpl
(minimization), whereas the second inequality correspond to
positive βpl (maximization). Therefore our proof will cover
both, positive and negative values of βpl. Now, we are ready
to handle the right-side of the equation making use of Corol-
lary 3 once again,
max
s∈S
max
apl∈A
∣∣Qpl(s,apl)− Q¯pl(s,apl)∣∣
= max
s∈S
max
apl∈A
∣∣∣∣∣ extpiop
[
Epiop [RG(s,apl,aop)
+ γET (s′|s,apl,aop)V(s′)]−
1
βop
KL(piop||ρop)
]
− ext
piop
[
Epiop [RG(s,apl,aop)
+ γETG(s′|s,apl,aop)V¯(s′)]−
1
βop
KL(piop||ρop)
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
s∈S
max
apl∈A
max
aop∈A
∣∣γETG (V(s′)− V¯(s′))∣∣
≤ γmax
s′∈S
∣∣V(s′)− V¯(s′)∣∣
= γ‖V − V¯‖∞.
A.3 Derivation Bounded Optimal Policies
In this section we sketch the derivation of the bounded op-
timal policies, first, for the player and, second, for the op-
ponent. The player chooses its policy pipl by first doing the
extremization extpiop and then its own maximization maxpipl .
pi?pl(a
pl|s) = arg max
pipl
∑
apl
pipl(a
pl|s)
(
1
βop
log
∑
aop
ρop(a
op|s) exp
(
βop
(RG(·) + γETG [V?(s′)]))
− 1
βpl
log
pipl(a
pl|s)
ρpl(apl|s)
)
.
Solving the maximization problem maxpipl by applying stan-
dard variational calculus we obtain the equation in the main
manuscript.
In contrast to the case of the player, the policy of the op-
ponent piop is computed by interchanging the extremization
operators from maxpipl extpiop to extpiop maxpipl . Therefore,
we have to solve first the inner maximization problem maxpl
over the player’s policy and then its own extremization extpiop
(that is a maximization for βop > 0 and a minimization for
βop < 0). Solving first for maxpl gives
pi?op(a
op|s) = arg ext
piop
∑
aop
piop(a
op|s)
(
1
βpl
log
∑
apl
ρpl(a
pl|s) exp
(
βpl
(RG(·) + γETGV?(s′)))
− 1
βop
log
piop(a
op|s)
ρop(aop|s)
)
.
Similarly, by applying standard variational calculus we can
solve for extpiop that gives the policy for the opponent written
in the main manuscript.
A.4 Maximum likelihood for estimation of βop
Consider the dataset of the form D =
{
si,a
pl
i ,a
op
i
}m
i=1
with
m being the total number of data points. The actions of
the opponent are sampled according to a fixed distribution
aopi ∼ pˆi(aopi |si) unknown to the player that can be approx-
imated with the player’s model of the opponent pi?op(a
op
i |si)
that is parametrized by the estimate of βop. The likelihood
of the data D can be written using the player’s model of the
opponent as
P (D|βop) =
m∏
i=1
pi?op(a
op
i |si)
=
m∏
i=1
1
Zop(si)
ρop(a
op
i |si) exp
(
βop
(
1
βpl
log
∑
apl
ρpl(a
pl|si) exp
(
βplQ(s,apl,aop)
)))
,
where
Z(si) =
∑
aopi
ρop(a
op
i |si) exp
(
βop
βpl
log
∑
apl
ρpl(a
pl|si)
exp
(
βplQ(s,apl,aop)
))
,
Then the partial derivative with respect to βop is
∂
∂βop
logP (D|βop) =
m∑
i=1
[
1
βop
logZ(si,a
op
i )−
∑
aopi ∈A
1
Z(si)
ρop(a
op
i |si) exp
(
βop
βpl
logZ(si,a
op
i )
)
×
1
βpl
logZ(si,a
op
i )
]
=
1
βpl
m∑
i=1
[
logZ(si,a
op
i )
−
∑
aopi ∈A
pi?op(a
op
i |si) logZ(si,aopi )
]
,
where
Z(si,a
op
i ) =
∑
apl
ρpl(a
pl|si) exp(βplQ(si,apl,aopi )).
This gradient is readily applicable given that the normalizing
functions can be computed exactly due to the action space
being discrete. Next we give the complete description of the
algorithm when learning the soft values and βop simultane-
ously.
Algorithm 2 Tabular Two-Player Soft Q-Learning with βop
estimation.
1: Given ρpl, ρop, βpl, A, S and learning rates α and α2
2: Q(s,apl,aop)← 0
3: βop ← arbitrary initial βop estimate
4: while not converged do
5: Collect transition
(
st,a
pl
t ,a
op
t ,Rt, s′t
)
, where apl ∼
pipl, aop ∼ piop andRt is the reward at time t.
6: Q(st,aplt ,aopt )← Q(st,aplt ,aopt )+α
(
Rt+γV(s′t)−
Q(st,aplt ,aopt )
)
,
7: βop ← βop + α2 ∂∂βop logP (D|βop) (α2: learning rate)
8: end while
9: return Q(s,apl,aop)
